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DFG Research Center (SFB) “From Heterogeneities to Inequalities” 
 
Whether fat or thin, male or female, young or old – people are different. Alongside their physi-
cal features, they also differ in terms of nationality and ethnicity; in their cultural preferences, 
lifestyles, attitudes, orientations, and philosophies; in their competencies, qualifications, and 
traits; and in their professions. But how do such heterogeneities lead to social inequalities? 
What are the social mechanisms that underlie this process? These are the questions pursued 
by the DFG Research Center (Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB)) “From Heterogeneities to 
Inequalities” at Bielefeld University, which was approved by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) as “SFB 882” on May 25, 2011. 
In the social sciences, research on inequality is dispersed across different research fields 
such as education, the labor market, equality, migration, health, or gender. One goal of the 
SFB is to integrate these fields, searching for common mechanisms in the emergence of 
inequality that can be compiled into a typology. More than fifty senior and junior researchers 
and the Bielefeld University Library are involved in the SFB. Along with sociologists, it brings 
together scholars from the Bielefeld University faculties of Business Administration and 
Economics, Educational Science, Health Science, and Law, as well as from the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin and the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. In 
addition to carrying out research, the SFB is concerned to nurture new academic talent, and 
therefore provides doctoral training in its own integrated Research Training Group. A data 
infrastructure project has also been launched to archive, prepare, and disseminate the data 
gathered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                       
      
 
 
 
 
 
Research Project A6 “The Legitimation of Inequalities – Structural Conditions of 
Justice Attitudes over the Life-span” 
 
This project investigates (a) the conditions under which inequalities are perceived as 
problems of justice and (b) how embedment in different social contexts influences the 
formation of attitudes to justice across the life course. 
We assume that individuals evaluate inequalities in terms of whether they consider them just, 
and that they hold particular attitudes toward justice because, and as long as, these help 
them to attain their fundamental goals and to solve, especially, the problems that arise 
through cooperation with other people (cooperative relations). As a result, attitudes on justice 
are not viewed either as rigidly stable orientations across the life span or as “Sunday best 
beliefs” i.e. short-lived opinions that are adjusted continuously to fit situational interests. 
Instead, they are regarded as being shaped by the opportunities for learning and making 
comparisons in different phases of the life course and different social contexts. 
The goal of the project is to use longitudinal survey data to explain why individuals have 
particular notions of justice. The key aspect is taken to be changes in the social context – 
particularly households, social networks, or workplaces – in which individuals are embedded 
across their life course. This is because social contexts offer opportunities to make social 
comparisons and engage in social learning, processes that are decisive in the formation of 
particular attitudes to justice. The project will test this empirically by setting up a special 
longitudinal panel in which the same individuals will be interviewed three times over an 11-
year period. 
The results of the project will permit conclusions to be drawn on the consequences of 
changes in a society's social and economic structure for its members' ideas about justice. 
The project therefore supplements the analysis of the mechanisms that produce inequality, 
which is the focus of SFB 882 as a whole, by looking at subjective evaluations, and it 
complements that focus by addressing the mechanisms of attitude formation. 
 
Research goals 
(1) Analysis of the conditions in which justice is used as a criterion for evaluating inequalities. 
(2) Explanation of attitudes toward justice as the outcome of comparison and learning 
processes mediated by the social context. 
(3) Longitudinal observation of the individual development of attitudes to justice over the life 
course. 
 
Research design 
(1) Continuation and expansion of the longitudinal survey of evaluations of justice conducted 
by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). 
(2) Commencement of an independent longitudinal panel with ties to the process-generated 
individual data of the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and information on 
companies and households (the plan is to carry out three survey waves over an 11-year 
period).   
 
                       
      
 
 
 
 
 
Research objectives and interests 
This project examines the social mechanisms in work organizations and private life that 
influence fathers’ participation in the family. It aims to analyze the reciprocal impact of work 
organizations and employees on the realization of personal and professional life goals. The 
project focuses on the question of how heterogeneities among the members of an 
organization result in social inequalities with respect to their capabilities at work and in family 
life. It asks what role is played in this process by “old” and “new” lines of differentiation; how 
the underlying, gendered norms of availability and expectations of compatibility between work 
and family life are constructed; and the extent to which processes of the production of 
inequality reinforce or attenuate each other within the various fields of action. 
The project works with a model of social inequality that analyzes the unequal distribution of 
opportunities for participation in the various areas of life; it is oriented on Amartya Sen’s 
“capability” approach. 
 
Levels of analysis 
On the organizational level, the project investigates how life conduct and the compatibility of 
family and career are discussed, which models and forms of legitimation acquire relevance, 
and how heterogeneity among the organization’s members influences their capabilities at 
work and in family life. The analysis looks at micropolitical negotiation processes within work 
organizations and the role of the actors participating in these, along with the ways that the life 
conduct of fathers is influenced by the framing conditions of the workplace and its 
organizational culture. The social construction of expectations of compatibility and norms of 
availability is examined in the context of organizational cultures and gender norms. 
On the level of private life, processes of negotiation within the couple relationship are 
analyzed in terms of their impact on the compatibility of work and parenthood for fathers. 
Relevant aspects here are patterns in the intrafamilial division of labor; the economic, social, 
and cultural resources of the partners; time budgets; and gendered models of parenthood 
and employment. In addition, individual life choices and cultural models may influence 
capabilities at work and in the family, as may individuals’ evaluation of their own capacity to 
act, their life skills, and the expectations of compatibility they place on work organizations. 
 
Project design 
In its first phase, the project is designed as a qualitative study, carrying out parallel case 
studies in selected companies. The case studies address the respective work organizations 
and their structural and cultural features, as the context for the investigation of fathers’ life 
conduct, orientations, and strategies and the negotiation processes within the couple. The 
analysis of the organizational context deploys document analyses, expert interviews, and 
observation. For the analysis of individual life conduct and couple negotiation processes, the 
project will carry out problem-centered interviews with fathers and their partners, group 
discussions with fathers, and interviews with mothers in the company being studied. 
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Abstract:  
Large-scale population surveys predominantly rely on interviewer-assisted data collection. 
Furthermore, the use of incentives is becoming common practice in survey research to in-
crease response rates. The focus of the present paper is on how these two structural condi-
tions of an interview situation influence the stated preferences for a more or less equal in-
come distribution in society. According to goal-framing theory (GFT) and the findings of em-
pirical justice research, different goal frames are activated in different types of relationships 
leading to different distributional preferences: a normative goal frame results in a stronger 
preference for equality in cooperative situations and a gain frame favors inequality in com-
petitive situations. The assumption is that the former type of relationship is established by the 
presence of an interviewer, the latter by incentivizing in a survey. Two experimental studies 
were designed to test our hypotheses. The results suggest that generating a collaborative rela-
tionship through interviewer presence and cooperation priming leads to a preference for 
equality in comparison to a neutral, competitive, or exchange situation using competitive 
priming techniques or incentives. 
 
Keywords: justice attitudes, inequality preferences, interviewer presence, incentives, priming 
techniques, factorial survey, survey methodology  
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1 Introduction 
It is a well-established finding from decades of research on survey methodology that the mode 
of data collection affects the willingness both to participate in a survey and to provide full, 
detailed responses to the questions asked. Coverage error, non-response error, and measure-
ment error are the most prominent types of survey errors related to how questionnaires are 
presented to respondents. Although there are some general findings that allow us to assess 
what topics, issues, and items are more likely to produce higher rates of survey errors, there is 
still a lack of theories that inform us accurately about the response behavior to be expected 
under certain structural conditions in an interview situation. Knowing exactly what kind of 
response sets are evoked by the structural condition of an interview situation is essential for 
identifying measurement errors and choosing appropriate adjustment methods. This is particu-
larly important in public opinion and attitude research where aggregate measures are used to 
draw substantial conclusions on the sentiments and opinions in a society with regard to vari-
ous political and societal issues. Here, it is not sufficient to know that there are some mode 
effects that influence the results but how the structural conditions of an interview situation 
systematically lead to a response set changing the overall picture of how the population of a 
certain society thinks, for instance, about social inequalities, welfare state issues, etc. 
The present paper focuses on two central structural features of an interview situation within 
large population surveys: the presence of an interviewer and conditional incentivizing. We 
examine how these two structural conditions affect a certain class of attitudes: preferences for 
social inequalities, i.e., the justice of the wage distribution in a society. A large number of 
studies show that each justice norm or justice principle – for example, the principle of equali-
ty, equity, or need – is associated with a specific type of social relation (cf. Tyler et al. 1997). 
The “logic of justice” means that in collaborative relationships goods should be distributed 
equally, in competitive relationships equitably and in family and kinship relations according 
to individual need. The resulting problem is well known in behavioral economics: when indi-
viduals need to make decisions on the allocation of rewards in various types of decision 
games, they divide up the money depending on the relationship they have with others in the 
situation. If individuals have collaborative relationships within the experimental setting, they 
allocate money and other rewards equally; if they are bound together in competitive relation-
ships, they prefer unequal allocations. Following the logic of justice, these findings show 
nothing more than that the kind of relationship an individual has in a decision-making situa-
tion is significant for his or her justice preferences. Applying these findings to large-scale 
survey research means that justice preferences expressed in these studies should be affected 
by the kind of relationship respondents have in the situation in which they are completing the 
questionnaire. Therefore, particularly in justice research, the kind of social relationship estab-
lished by the interview setting is crucial and it makes a difference whether there is an inter-
viewer present – seeking to establish a collaborative relationship with the respondents – or 
whether a lone respondent is sitting in front of a computer screen or with a questionnaire at 
the kitchen table without any personal contact to an interviewer.  
However, standard situations in large-scale surveys are not only characterized by the presence 
or absence of an interviewer; in the light of declining participation rates, more and more 
population surveys are attempting to increase willingness to participate by offering monetary 
or non-monetary incentives. Research shows that incentives do indeed lead to an increase in 
participation but they appear to have no effect on data quality (i.e., item non-response, drop-
outs, etc., Toepoel 2012).  Surprisingly, there is no existing research – to our knowledge – on 
the effects of payment or non-material incentives on response behavior which goes beyond 
the classical issues of non-response or response sets (Göritz 2004). However, on the basis of 
the research on the logic of justice, it should not be irrelevant whether respondents are paid 
for completing a questionnaire or whether they participate voluntarily. In both cases, different 
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social relations are established by the interview setting. The basic idea behind incentivizing is 
to compensate a respondent for the time he or she spends with an interviewer or takes to com-
plete a self-administered questionnaire. If respondents are paid for their participation, an 
(economic) exchange situation is established between them and an interviewer or the institu-
tion carrying out the survey. According to the logic of justice, the appropriate principle in 
such a social relation is the equity principle, which is a principle of inequality. In contrast, if 
respondents participate voluntarily, they cannot expect either monetary or non-monetary 
compensation for their effort. Instead – in the case of scientific surveys – they collaborate 
with the interviewer to produce a “public good.” Thus, interview settings without payments 
resemble the type of relationship where the equality principle seems to be appropriate. The 
decision to employ incentives in a survey is then also a decision about the social relationship 
within the interview situation. The central question becomes whether the “priming” by the 
structural features of an interview situation has any consequences for the justice attitudes ex-
pressed by respondents. Following the logic of justice, we would expect preferences for 
equality under voluntary conditions and more inequality-oriented attitudes to justice under 
incentivized conditions.  
The aim of this paper is to prove these assumptions. It examines whether the two stated char-
acteristics of an interview situation – interviewer presence and incentivizing – affect what 
respondents regard as just and fair, or, more precisely, if a respondent’s preference for an 
equal or unequal distribution of earnings within a society depends on the fact that an inter-
viewer is present or that he or she receives money for participating in a survey after having 
completed a self-administered questionnaire. Following Lindenberg’s goal-framing theory 
(GFT), we explain the dependency of justice preferences on an interview setting by the activa-
tion of cognitive frames: we expect the situational context to influence attitudes towards so-
cial justice by activating specific (master) frames. In more cooperative settings, induced, for 
instance, by the presence of an interviewer, a normative frame evokes a sense of equality. In 
economic exchange situations, induced for example by the use of incentives, the gain frame 
produces a sense of inequality. We test our assumptions in two experimental settings with 
undergraduates from a German university. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, the logic of justice is introduced on the basis of em-
pirical justice research. Next, the findings of behavioral economics on the situational vulnera-
bility of justice behavior and attitudes are reported. The third section presents the theoretical 
model based on GFT and the hypotheses on the situational dependency of (in-)equality pref-
erences. The methods section describes the experimental design, measurement of variables, 
and sample issues, followed by the presentation and discussion of the findings.  
 
2 The Logic of Justice 
What people consider to be just depends on the situational context. Following the pioneering 
work of Morton Deutsch (1985) and a number of subsequent empirical studies (Tyler et al. 
1997), each distributive principle has – at least in Western countries – a corresponding social 
context that determines what people consider to be just. Four distributive principles may be 
distinguished: equity, equality, need, and desert. While the equity and the desert principle 
result in an unequal distribution of resources, goods or burdens, principles of equality and 
need aim at an equal distribution. Furthermore, research suggests there is a link between rela-
tional ties and distributive principles: in enduring, close, and collaborative relationships (e.g. 
work groups, peer groups, and families) the equality principle is generally preferred as the 
predominant norm to solve distributive problems. In situations of social competition and eco-
nomic exchange that prohibit deep emotional ties among actors and are meant to increase per-
sonal (material) welfare, an unequal distribution of resources is considered to be just accord-
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ing to individual contributions and personal achievements. Consequently, perceptions of so-
cial injustice occur if the type of social relation conflicts with the “appropriate” distributive 
principle (for instance, if resources in a family are allocated according to the equity principle, 
i.e., food for affection or performance).  
In short, research on social justice demonstrates the importance of the relational and structural 
context for distributional preferences. The question arises whether these relational dependen-
cies help to understand whether and how situational cues in the interview setting affect re-
sponses on justice issues. Empirical studies in behavioral economics and social psychology 
provide useful insights by experimentally testing the influences of situational conditions on 
attitudes towards and behavior related to the allocation of scarce resources.  
 
3 Research on the Situational Conditions of Justice Behavior and Attitudes 
Research indicates that the structural conditions of an interview situation – framing with re-
gard to the type of social relationship, anonymity, and incentivizing – have an effect on the 
orientation towards equality or inequality of respondents. The relational framing and the de-
gree of anonymity are considered as situational cues also present in an interview situation 
with an interviewer. The perceived anonymity of the respondent is, for example, reduced in 
the interview situation by interviewer presence and interaction. In this section, we report re-
search findings on the effects of situational framing and anonymity in experimental research, 
the use of incentives in survey research, and its implications for research on distributive jus-
tice. 
Behavior regarding distributional decisions about the allocation of monetary resources in ex-
perimental settings illustrates the vulnerability of attitudes towards justice linked to situational 
conditions.  Liberman et al. (2004) framed an iterated prisoner’s dilemma either as the Wall 
Street Game or as the Community Game, the former inducing a competitive frame and the 
latter a collaborative frame. Participants in the Community Game were significantly more 
willing to cooperate with the other participants. Hertel and Fiedler (1994) primed their sub-
jects by using evaluative and emotional priming with positive and negative connotations of 
cooperation and competition. Unsurprisingly, positive connotations of cooperation led the 
participants to cooperate more. Also, situational framing in general is effective in altering 
behavior or attitudes. Hole (2011) tested how priming by using a communication phase on 
fairness before a one-shot dictator game would influence the decision of dictators in the dis-
tribution phase. Participants in the treatment group were asked during this communication 
phase what they thought might be a fair distribution. There was no communication on fairness 
in the control group before the dictator game. The offers of the framed subjects were signifi-
cantly higher than those of the control group. This result was supported by Liebig (2001) with 
regard to justice attitudes. Subjects who were given a detailed description of how philoso-
phers understand justice and that justice attitudes must rely on a “moral judgment” to over-
come self-interest showed an attitude pattern on the justice of taxes which was less affected 
by self-interest. In sum, the relational framing of a situation has an effect on the distributional 
decision-making process. This confirms the hypothesis of the dependency of justice attitudes 
on the relationship at hand; the logic of justice. 
Furthermore, empirical findings report that anonymity or social relations between participants 
has an effect on the generosity in dictator games or the amount of investment in public goods 
games or trust games. Hoffman et al. (1994; 1996) varied the anonymity between participants 
in a dictator game. The more anonymous the situation was for the dictator, the less he or she 
was willing to give. Gächter and Fehr (1999) show similar results for investments in a public 
good game. Communication between participants also led them to invest more in a trust game 
(Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004) or to give the receiver a higher amount of money in a dicta-
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tor game (Xiao and Houser 2009). Findings were similar when the family names of the play-
ers were revealed to the others (Charness and Gneezy 2008) or the anonymity between subject 
and experimenter was varied (Bolton and Zwick 1995). 
Moreover, there is some evidence that it is not only the physical presence of others that affects 
individual inequality preferences but that simply placing visual cues of eyes on a computer 
screen alters participant behavior (Burnham and Hare 2007; Haley and Fessler 2005; Rigdon 
et al. 2009; Bateson et al. 2006). In dictator games, images of eyes presented to the dictator 
lead to higher than average monetary gifts for the receiver (Haley and Fessler 2005; Rigdon et 
al. 2009). Similar results were found by Burnham and Hare (2007) in a public goods game 
displaying the image of a robot with human eyes on the computer screen. Subjects in the 
“eyes” condition contributed significantly more (29% more) to the public good than subjects 
in the control condition (Burnham and Hare 2007: 98). Bateson et al. (2006) displayed an im-
age of a pair of eyes above an honesty box in a university coffee room and observed that peo-
ple paid more when they were “watched” by eyes than in a control condition with neutral im-
ages. Cues of eyes activate, subconsciously, brain regions that are responsible for detecting 
human faces, including gaze and facial expression, and result in a subconscious awareness of 
“being watched” or “observed.” In summary, an image or even very weak cues of eyes seem 
to foster behavior that is interpreted as prosocial or altruistic.  
Finally, in survey research, the positive effect of incentives on the willingness to participate is 
well documented (Toepoel 2012). Besides this targeted effect, several studies examine the 
unintended effects of incentives on data quality and response bias. Regarding data quality, no 
negative effect of incentives could be found; in fact, it often improves (Toepoel 2012; Becker 
and Mehlkop 2011: 8; Singer et al. 2000). However, there are mixed results for response bias. 
Most studies were not able to confirm incentive effects on responses (James and Bolstein 
1990: 348; Becker and Mehlkop 2011: 19), but some studies find – at least for some attitudi-
nal measures – significant differences (Singer et al. 2000; James and Bolstein 1990: 346). Yet, 
there has been no research to date – at least to our knowledge – on the effects of incentives on 
normative attitudes as distributional justice. Nonetheless, in experimental research, incentives 
affect distributional decision-making processes. Incentives are used in laboratory experiments 
in two ways: first as a “show up” fee for participants and then as performance-related incen-
tives incorporated in the experimental setting. Regarding the latter, many studies have been 
conducted to examine the effects on behavior in relation to performance and decisions. As 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) state, “the overwhelming finding is that increased incentives do 
not change average behavior substantively although the variance of responses often decreases. 
When behavior does change, incentives can be interpreted as shifting behavior away from an 
overly socially-desirable presentation of oneself to a more realistic one: When incentives are 
low subjects say they would be more risk-preferring and generous than they actually are when 
incentives are increased.” (Camerer and Hogarth 1999: 8). We can conclude that the results 
on incentives and response behavior are not homogenous and not significantly related to jus-
tice behavior or attitudes.  
However, we know little on the use of incentives for survey research on social justice. We can 
only learn from past research that incentives establish what Peter Blau called an “economic 
exchange situation,” where the norm of reciprocity regulates the expectations of the actors. 
Two types of incentives are used in surveys: unconditional incentives – respondents receive a 
reward before the interview starts – and conditional incentives with a payment afterwards. 
According to the literature on gift exchange, payment in advance establishes an exchange 
relation which is unbalanced on the side of the respondents and the reciprocity norm demands 
a rebalancing, so respondents who show a strong norm-orientation will feel obliged to partici-
pate. On the other hand, the conditional incentives create an economic exchange situation 
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where the respondent has to solve the task in order to obtain the reward (van Veen et al. 
2012).  
According to the logic of justice, it will be relevant whether respondents are paid for complet-
ing a questionnaire or whether they participate voluntarily. If respondents are paid retrospec-
tively for participation, an economic exchange situation is established between the respondent 
and interviewer carrying out the survey, invoking the equity principle which fosters inequality 
preferences. In contrast, if respondents participate in non-incentivized studies, they collabo-
rate with the interviewer to produce a “public good.” Thus, interview settings without pay-
ments or incentives are close to the type of relationship for which the equality principle seems 
to be appropriate. 
In short, research suggests that (1) justice attitudes or distributive behaviors are prone to the 
situational cues of an experimental set-up or an interview setting, (2) justice behaviors and 
attitudes depend on the fact that there is a social relationship while people formulate their 
judgments or decide how to behave, and (3) payment or incentivizing may trigger a different 
perception of the kind of social relationship within an interview setting. These findings can be 
explained by Lindenberg’s goal-framing theory (GFT). It (a) clarifies the theoretical link be-
tween the situational or relational cues and justice attitudes and (b) helps to formulate specific 
hypotheses on the situational conditions in which people prefer more or less inequality in so-
ciety.  
 
4 Explaining Justice Attitudes by Goal-Framing Theory 
Following the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1984, 2000), the literature on situa-
tional framing shows that people pay selective attention to situational cues when they make 
decisions. They are aware of cues that give them the information needed to pursue their cur-
rent motivational goal and other information is suppressed. On the other hand, certain situa-
tional cues activate specific information and knowledge in the memory. Selective attention 
and the activation process are governed by a cognitive-motivational process which is called 
the “framing process.” It includes the mechanism by which motivational goals influence the 
cognitive processes of an actor and his or her mental models of the given situation. Mental 
models are particularly relevant in social relationships because a mental model contains in-
formation about the prototype of a relationship and its behavioral rules, expectations, and so-
cial norms. Therefore, it helps to know what kind of behavior is appropriate or expected of an 
actor in a specific situation. The actor is using situational cues in order to define what kind of 
situation or relationship is at hand and to act appropriately and efficiently according to his or 
her goals. 
As part of a general theory of human action (Lindenberg 2006, 1990, 2001), GFT classifies 
three types of “master frames”: a normative frame with the goal “to act appropriately,” a gain 
frame with the goal “to increase one’s resources,” and a hedonic frame with the goal “to feel 
better” (Lindenberg 2006: 34-35). The master frame forms the core motivation for behavior as 
long as it is in the foreground. There are other goals that influence selective attention and be-
havior from the background. GFT also assumes that the three frames have a different strength. 
The hedonic frame is considered first because it is the strongest due to its closeness to the self 
and its emotional connection. The gain frame is considered second and the normative frame 
third. Therefore, the normative frame is most dependent on the support of other background 
goals because its strength is the weakest. 
The master frame and mental model that is active in a given situation depend on the structural 
conditions of that situation, a person’s cultural knowledge (for example, what rules exist for 
solving distributional conflicts) and – according to the more general theory of social produc-
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tion functions (Ormel et al. 1999) – the actual level of physical well-being and social approv-
al. We assume that the two structural conditions within an interview or experimental situation, 
i.e., the presence of an interviewer and the use of incentives, affect which foreground goal 
frame may be activated. Once a goal frame is activated, it is part of the “cultural” knowledge 
of an individual to know the “right” mental model for behaving properly. Here, the findings 
from justice research come into play: the corresponding mental model is the logic of justice 
where an ideal type of social relation connects with one of the four general justice principles.  
In order to derive empirical assumptions on the situational characteristics of an interview situ-
ation and the resulting “biases” towards equality or inequality, we must (1) consider what type 
of social relation is established within an interview situation and (2) ask what kind of ex-
pected behavior or attitude is related to this (Lindenberg 2006). In a non-incentivized popula-
tion survey, respondents receive no money for participating and they must also bear costs in 
terms of time and answering cognitively demanding or personal questions; accordingly, peo-
ple mainly participate in surveys because they feel obliged to do so. Therefore, non-
incentivized surveys basically rely on the willingness to cooperate in order to produce a pub-
lic good. This collaborative motivation on the side of respondents is reinforced by interview-
ers as they often try to motivate respondents to participate by asking for “help” or “support.” 
Under these conditions, GFT assumes that a respondent’s goal is to act appropriately and that 
the normative frame will be active in the foreground. The behavior associated with a norma-
tive goal frame is prosocial behavior where a person is prepared to bear costs to benefit others 
because this is appropriate.2 According to the logic of justice, the dominant norm of allocating 
or distributing resources within a collaborative relation is the equality principle. Under the 
condition of an activated normative goal frame, we expect respondents, when asked to evalu-
ate inequalities, to formulate their judgments in light of the equality principle. Hence, re-
spondents should reveal higher preferences for equality in non-incentivized interview settings. 
Interviewer presence will enforce this equality orientation as the interviewer tries actively to 
establish a collaborative relationship; the interviewer will also be perceived as an agency con-
trolling whether or not respondents are acting appropriately.  
Incentivizing participation in a survey establishes a social relationship where both actors are 
oriented towards their self-interest. Giving money conditionally for completing the question-
naire establishes a short-term exchange relation – investing time and effort for completing a 
questionnaire is rewarded with a certain amount of money. Under these conditions, GFT as-
sumes that respondents frame the situation according to their personal gains. Following the 
logic of justice, the principle required to solve distributional conflicts under these conditions 
is the equity principle; all players receive according to what they contribute. Therefore, we 
would expect respondents with an activated gain frame to evaluate inequalities on the basis of 
the equity principle, which leads to a stronger orientation towards inequality.  
Our baseline assumption is that the type of social relationship established in an interview set-
ting determines the activation of a specific cognitive frame that in turn influences the response 
behavior (here: preferences towards inequality). In particular, we assume a cooperative rela-
tionship to activate a normative frame that consequently induces preferences for equality; a 
competitive situation is meant to activate the gain frame that induces preferences for inequali-
ty. These relational conditions may cause biases in the response behavior in survey research, 
especially on attitudes towards social justice. Following our theoretical reasoning, the inter-
                                                 
2 Prosocial behavior can also be observed in the gain or hedonic frame, but the motivation is different. In the 
former frame, people act prosocially when it is an efficient means to increase gain and in the hedonic frame 
when it feels good. 
8 
view condition will produce different preferences for (in)equality. We expect two situational 
cues to be of specific importance: (a) the presence of others, for instance, an interviewer, and 
(b) the use of incentives.  
In total, four hypotheses are derived from the above theoretical reasoning. First, we expect a 
correlation between the types of social relations and the preferred distributive principles:  
• (H1) In collaborative situations, respondents select the equality principle, expressed in 
the preference for a more equal distribution of resources.  
• (H2) In competitive situations, respondents use the equity principle, expressed in the 
preference for a more unequal distribution of resources. 
Accordingly, we expect the specific interview conditions to influence the response behavior: 
• (H3) In interviewer-assisted situations, the equality orientation is stronger compared to 
situations without the presence of an interviewer.  
• (H4) In incentivized interview situations, the inequality orientation is stronger com-
pared to those that are non-incentivized.  
 
5 Empirical Design  
In order to test our hypotheses, we need an accurate measurement of inequality preferences 
and an adequate empirical method. We opted for a laboratory experiment (Study 1) and an 
experimental survey study (Study 2). The laboratory experiment has several advantages such 
as allowing us to test the direct effect of a factor on the dependent variable in an artificial sit-
uation where other factors are controlled for. Furthermore, the random assignment of subjects 
to the control or the treatment group assures that no external traits of the subjects influence 
the measured effect (Webster/Sell 2007: 12). For our research question, the experiment gives 
us the opportunity to control the interview situation regarding the presence of other people 
and the behavior of the interviewer. The second study was an experimental survey study 
where the experimental design (random assignment) allows for the analysis of the treatments. 
In both studies, we varied between three experimental conditions: (a) the activation of a spe-
cific mindset (cooperation vs. neutrality and cooperation vs. competition) through priming 
techniques, (b) the presence of another person while a self-administered questionnaire is com-
pleted, and (c) the use of incentives for participation.   
Table 1: Research design of Study 1 and Study 2 
Study Priming  Presence of others  Incentives 
1 Cooperation vs. neutral Interviewer present: yes/no  no treatment: everyone receives 
EUR 10 as a “show-up fee” 
2 Cooperation vs. competition Eyes on screen: yes/no EUR 5 vs. no incentive 
 
Priming: Two relational cues, “cooperation” and “competition,” are activated subliminally by 
using the scrambled sentence test as a priming technique. It was originally introduced by Srull 
and Wyer (1979) and appeared to be the most appropriate technique for our study. Before 
being presented with the actual questionnaire, respondents were asked to participate in a 
“cognitive language test” (which we called a “Sprachfertigkeitsübung”). They had to build 
logical sentences out of a given number of word sets. We expected to activate a “cooperative” 
or a “competitive” mindset through the use of specific words associated with the two mindsets 
initiated. We varied the priming conditions in the two experiments and tested cooperation 
priming vs. a neutral control group in Study 1 and cooperation priming vs. competition prim-
ing in Study 2. 
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Presence of others: We measure the influence of the presence of an interviewer on 
(in)equality orientations using two different experimental set-ups: (a) the presence or absence 
of another person in the room (simulating interviewer presence or absence) in Study 1 and (b) 
the placement or not of an image of eyes on the screen of the online questionnaire in Study 2 
(cf. Figure A1 in the Appendix). The control groups filled out the questionnaire with no other 
person in the room in Study 1 or on a computer screen with no images of eyes in Study 2.  
Incentives: We tested the effect of incentives on (in)equality orientations in Study 2. We ran-
domly selected two groups: the first group was asked to participate in our online survey with-
out any incentive. The second group was offered a payment of EUR 5 for participating in the 
study which they would receive after completing the questionnaire.  
Inequality preference: One-item measures of attitudes towards income inequality are prob-
lematic since they produce virtually no variation in the responses about inequality prefer-
ences. Social desirability or the non-specificity of the research question itself are potential 
reasons for this. The use of a factorial survey design (Jasso 2006; Rossi and Anderson 1982; 
Wallander 2009) seems to be advisable since it measures specific preferences towards earn-
ings inequality indirectly by asking respondents to evaluate the justice of earnings on the basis 
of several descriptions of fictitious employees (vignettes). These multiple evaluations of just 
earnings can be used to reconstruct the individual inequality preference.  
For our study, we used vignettes that describe full-time employees (working 40 hours per 
week) who differ in ascribed and labor-market-related characteristics and who earn a specific 
monthly gross income (cf. Table 1A in the Appendix). The selection of these dimensions was 
based on theoretical considerations grounded on previous studies (Alves and Rossi 1978; 
Alves 1982; Jasso and Webster 1997; Jasso and Rossi 1977; Jasso and Webster 1999; Sauer et 
al. 2011; Sauer et al. 2009; Struck et al. 2006). The vignettes were presented on a computer 
screen using the same layout in all experimental settings. Figure 1 shows an example of a vi-
gnette text. 
Figure 1: Example of a vignette 
A 55-year-old women with no vocational training has three children and works as a clerk. 
She works in a company with a stable economic situation. Her performance is over average. 
Her monthly gross earnings total 1,500 EUR (before tax and other deductions). 
 
A sample of 20 vignettes was drawn randomly from the vignette universe and presented to the 
subjects, meaning that each participant rated exactly the same vignettes.3 The evaluation task 
was to decide whether or not the specific amount of gross earnings was just for the person 
described in the vignette and if not, what a just amount of gross earnings in local currency 
(EUR) would be.4 The just earnings provided by the participants were then used to calculate 
                                                 
3 In other research designs, it is useful to draw several decks to have ratings of as many vignettes as possible. 
Furthermore, sophisticated sampling techniques are recommended in order to arrive at efficient estimations of 
the coefficients (Atzmüller and Steiner 2010; Dülmer 2007). This is not necessary in the set-up described be-
cause we are investigating differences using different experimental settings. 
4 To avoid response heuristics that make it easier to state a preference for the earnings described on the vignette 
by simply checking a box instead of typing, participants were forced to insert a specific amount of money even 
when they thought the given earnings were just. In this situation, subjects had to type into the blank field the 
value that was given on the vignette description. Within the factorial survey literature, this is known as the “di-
rect approach” where respondents use an open scale to insert a value as opposed to the “indirect approach” 
where respondents do not provide a specific amount of money but evaluate the justice by ratings on a justice 
scale (sometimes a rating scale but may also be open scales) and, subsequently, the researcher estimates the just 
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the Gini coefficient. This inequality measure is the outcome variable for all the following 
analyses. 
 
5.1 Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to test the impact of two experimental conditions on individual prefer-
ences for inequality: (1) the effect of cooperation priming and (2) the presence of others on 
preferences towards (in)equality. The experiment was conducted at a German University dur-
ing the winter semester of 2011. The participants were undergraduate students who responded 
to handouts that were distributed in the university building containing basic information about 
the study (time, place, duration, and compensation).  
The sample consists of 145 undergraduate students. Participants were randomly assigned to 
the experimental treatments.5 Table 2 shows the distribution of participants for the different 
experimental conditions: 65 participants (45%) completed the survey in the presence of an-
other person, while 80 participants (55%) filled out the questionnaire with no other person 
present in the room; 79 (54%) of all participants were primed on cooperation, while 66 (46%) 
were given neutral primes.  
Table 2: Number of respondents per experimental condition in absolute values 
Priming 
Interviewer presence 
Cooperation 
(experimental group) 
Neutrality 
(control group) N 
Other person/interviewer: 
present 35 30 65   (45%) 
Other person/interviewer: 
absent 44 36 80   (55%) 
N 79 (54%) 66 (46%) 145 (100%) 
Source: “Experiment on the influence of cooperative relationships on justice evaluations.” Own calculations. 
DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/SFB882.2012.1  
 
The experiments were conducted in two labs equipped with a computer screen on a table 
along with a chair for the participant, and a table and chair for the interviewer. Participants 
were asked to fill in a questionnaire on issues of social justice, personal background, and other 
questions used to control for side effects, for example, using a social desirability scale. On 
average, participants completed the questionnaire in 35 minutes.  
 
5.1.1 Measurement 
Preferences towards (in)equality were measured by the factorial survey design described 
above.  
Priming: Participants were asked to construct 20 sentences using 4 of 5 words given to them. 
The cooperative mindset was activated by the use of words closely tied to “cooperation” such 
as “together,” “help,” “cooperation,” “fair,” “trust,” and “sharing.” In total, 10 out of 20 sen-
                                                                                                                                                        
earnings by means of individual regression techniques (Jasso 2006; Jasso and Wegener 1997). It is discussed in 
the literature that the direct answers may lead to anchor effects – respondents orienting their ratings to the in-
come provided on the vignette – but this is unproblematic in this setting because only differences between exper-
imental groups are analyzed.  
5 The questionnaire was programmed with a web survey software program (Unipark). 
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tences (50 percent) included primed wordings. The priming instrument was developed on the 
basis of previous studies on cooperation priming (Bargh et al. 2001; Bry et al. 2009; 
Drouvelis et al. 2010; Kay and Ross 2003). The control group received neutral sentences that 
did not activate a competition-specific cognitive frame.6  
Presence of others: All participants filled out the questionnaire in a laboratory. Participants 
who were randomly assigned to the experimental group did so with another person present in 
the room. Participants in the experimental group were welcomed by an experimenter7 who 
introduced them to the set-up of the study and stayed in the room while the participant filled 
out the questionnaire. The experimenter was asked to behave quietly without watching the 
computer screen of the participant, to create a cooperative atmosphere and to hand a show-up 
fee to the participant after he or she completed the questionnaire. Participants in the control 
group were shown to the room by the secretary and filled out the questionnaire with no other 
person present. The participants were paid the show-up fee by the secretary after they com-
pleted the questionnaire.  
Incentives: All participants received a monetary show-up fee of EUR 10 after completing the 
questionnaire. As we do not vary incentivizing in this study, we are not able to test the effect 
of incentives.  
Social desirability: To ensure that our results are not biased by social desirability, we used 
three items of the impression management scale based on the work of Paulhus (1984, 1991) 
and empirically tested by Winkler et al. (2006). 
 
5.1.2 Results 
Comparing the means of the individual Gini coefficients of participants with and without the 
presence of an interviewer reveals no significant difference in inequality preferences (Giniw/o 
= .28; Giniw/ = .29; t = -1.20; p(t)  = .23). The same applies to the priming condition: partici-
pants who received a cooperative prime did not deviate significantly in their reports on ine-
quality preferences from those in the neutral priming condition (Ginicoop. = .29; Ginineutral = 
.30; t =  0.58; p(T>t) = .28). It seems that neither the mere presence of others nor the cogni-
tive priming on cooperation is a sufficient condition for activating a normative goal frame.  
To filter the true effect of the two experimental conditions from the effects induced by the 
laboratory settings (two labs) and/or characteristics of the interviewer, we decided to run a 
mixed-effects multi-level regression analysis controlling for contextual influences.8 We con-
ducted separate analyses for participants with and without the presence of another person in 
the room. This procedure proved to be the most appropriate since the presence or absence of a 
third person did not directly reveal any significant differences in response behavior towards 
earnings inequalities.  
Figure 2 shows the findings of a multi-level regression analysis in which the effects of prim-
ing on preferences for inequality are reported for the two conditions (with and without the 
                                                 
6 Four participants reported signs that they were aware of being primed. To avoid contrast effects, we excluded 
these participants from the analyses. 
7 We recruited graduate students from a class on social stratification (Master’s level) to work as experimenters 
(N=14; 50% female/male).  
8 The use of multi-level models is advisable to control for differences in the study set-up. We controlled for in-
fluences of (a) the laboratory and (b) the experimenter. 
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presence of the interviewer). The graph displays the change in the Gini coefficient in percent-
ages (see Table A2 in the Appendix for the regression coefficients).  
Figure 2: Change in Gini in percent by interviewer presence 
 
Source: “Experiment on the influence of cooperative relationships on justice evaluations.” Own calculations. 
DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/SFB882.2012.1  
 
Findings in the left-hand panel show differences in preferences towards inequalities (Gini 
coefficient) for the experimental setting with the experimenter in the room; the right-hand 
panel shows the differences for the experimental setting without the presence of the experi-
menter.  
Presence of another person: The cooperative priming condition reduced preferences for ine-
quality if another person was present. Participants primed on cooperation preferred less ine-
quality (10 percent of the absolute value of the Gini) than those with neutral mindsets. To 
control for social desirability biases, the impression management scale was included in the 
analysis. Findings on social desirability biases show that participants with high scores also 
prefer less inequality which is about six percent lower, compared to those without this tenden-
cy.  
No other person is present: Participants who completed the questionnaire without another 
person in the room did not vary in their preferences towards inequality (neither by priming 
nor by social desirability). The findings support the explanations of social desirability that 
state a bias only in situations with other people present who provide social approval and, thus, 
satisfy social needs (Stocké 2004; Esser 1991).  
 
5.1.3 Summary 
In sum, the results indicate that the combination of the presence of another person in the room 
while the cooperative frame is activated significantly reduces individual preferences for ine-
quality. Nevertheless, it is quite unclear why the priming on cooperation has no significant 
main effect. Following GFT, the single activation of a normative frame should be enough to 
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alter the behavior of individuals. There are at least two possible explanations: (1) The priming 
was too weak and the difference between the two priming conditions not distinct enough. (2) 
Since participants knew that they would receive money for completing the interview, it is pos-
sible that the gain frame is activated, which conflicts with the cooperative frame. Therefore, 
we conducted a second study that enabled us to empirically answer the remaining questions 
on the use of (a) different priming conditions, (b) incentives, and (c) (simulated) presence of 
others on preferences towards (in)equality.  
 
5.2 Study 2 
Study 2 was designed as a follow-up study to test the impact of three experimental conditions 
on individual preferences for inequality: (1) the differing effects of priming (cooperation vs. 
competition), (2) the presence of others simulated by eyes on the computer screen (eyes vs. no 
eyes) and (3) the impact of incentives (incentivized vs. voluntary participation) on attitudes 
towards inequality. The study was conducted during the summer semester of 2012 at the same 
German university. The respondents were recruited from an undergraduate course. Students 
received an email inviting them to participate in an online survey regarding the inequality of 
earnings. Out of 724 who were invited to participate in the study, 210 students completed the 
questionnaire (response rate: 41%; with incentive; 20% without incentive). All participants 
were randomly selected: first, they had a 27.6% percent chance of being selected to the incen-
tive sample; second, all participants had a 50 percent chance of being selected for the experi-
mental conditions (priming and the presence of eyes on the computer screen).   
Table 2: Number of respondents per experimental condition 
 No incentive Incentive  
 No eyes Eyes No eyes Eyes N 
Priming on cooperation  32 31 23 19 105 (50%) 
Priming on competition  35 31 19 20 105 (50%) 
N 67 (32%) 62 (29%) 42 (20%) 39 (19%) 2109 
Source: “Experiment on the influence of interviewer presence and incentivizing on justice evaluations.” Own 
calculations. DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/SFB882.2012.2  
 
 
5.2.1 Measurement 
Preferences towards (in)equality were measured by the factorial survey design described 
above.  
Priming for cooperation vs. competition: We induced two different mindsets: cooperation and 
competition. For this reason, we improved the scrambled sentence test we used in Study 1 by 
shortening it to 12 sentences and increasing the number of primed words. The 9 ‘cooperation’ 
primes mostly resemble the words of the first priming condition in Study 1. The 9 ‘competi-
tion’ primes were developed on the basis of recent literature (Kay and Ross 2003; Bargh et al. 
2001; Bry et al. 2009). Words such as “competition,” “comparison,” “arguing,” “power,” “as-
sertion,” “provocation,” “winning,” and “inconsiderate behavior” were used to induce a com-
                                                 
9 For our analysis we excluded three participants because of their awareness of being primed. 9 cases were 
dropped due to item non-response. 
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petitive mindset. To ensure the comparability of the two experimental conditions, the sentenc-
es only differed in the specific priming but not in the structure of the sentence itself.10  
Presence of others: We choose to simulate the presence of others by displaying eyes on the 
computer screen while the respondent answered the questions. We used natural looking eyes 
in the top right-hand corner of the screen (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). The eyes were not 
meant to be too prominent since we wanted to induce a feeling of being watched at a subcon-
scious level. Questions on awareness and interpretation of the eyes were asked at the end of 
the questionnaire. In the control group, participants answered the same questionnaire without 
seeing eyes on the screen. 
Social desirability: Again, we used the three items on social desirability, i.e., impression man-
agement (see Winkler et al. 2006). 
 
5.2.2 Results 
Comparing the means of the individual Gini coefficients of participants with and without the 
presence of eyes on the computer screen reveals no significant difference in inequality prefer-
ences (Giniw/o = .28; Giniw = .28; t = -0.0932; p(t) = 0.93). In contrast, the priming condition 
shows significant differences in inequality preferences (at the 10% significance level): partic-
ipants who received a cooperative prime preferred less inequality than participants who re-
ceived competition priming (Ginicoop. = .27; Ginicomp = .29; t = 1.06; p(T>t) = 0.055). Whether 
these results are sensitive to characteristics of the participants (sex, age) and/or the contextual 
setting and whether they are biased due to social desirability is tested in the subsequent sec-
tion.   
We estimated ordinary least square regression models with the rated individual Gini of each 
respondent as a dependent variable. Figure 3 shows the change in the Gini coefficient in per-
cent in relation to the condition where respondents were primed on competition and no eyes 
on their screen (see Table A3 in the Appendix for the regression coefficients). The results are 
highly sensitive to whether eyes were shown on the screen or not. When eyes were placed on 
the screen, the priming and the incentives did not show any effect on inequality preferences. If 
eyes were not shown on the screen, respondents primed on cooperation showed a significantly 
lower inequality preference of about 15 percent compared to those primed for competition. 
Additionally, we found an effect of incentives: respondents who received an incentive showed 
a significantly higher preference for inequality compared to those who answered the ques-
tionnaire voluntarily. The results show no biases for social desirability.  
 
                                                 
10 To avoid any contrast effects, we excluded three participants from our analyses who showed signs of aware-
ness that they were being primed. 
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Figure 3: Change in Gini in percent with priming and eyes on screen 
 
Source: “Experiment on the influence of interviewer presence and incentivizing on justice evaluations.” Own 
calculations. DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/SFB882.2012.2  
 
We also tested for the absolute effect of “eyes on the screen.” We assumed that eyes can be 
seen as a substitute for interviewer presence and, therefore, expected eyes on the screen to 
lead to a smaller Gini. The results only show a significant effect of eyes for people who are 
primed on competition. Presumably, if a person is in a competitive frame, eyes are perceived 
as situational cues for social control and anticipated sanctions in the event of norm-violating 
behavior.  
 
5.2.3 Summary 
In sum, the results confirm our hypothesis on relational mindsets: in the no-eyes condition, 
respondents with cooperation priming prefer more equality than those with competition prim-
ing. Furthermore, there is a significant effect of payment, which is in accordance with our 
hypothesis (H4). Both hypotheses (H2, H4) regarding the activated gain frame can be con-
firmed. The results regarding the presence of another person in the room, substituted by “eyes 
on the screen,” are less straight forward. Hence, “being watched” has no effect on people who 
are already primed on collaborative action. Rather, “being watched” by eyes cancels out the 
cooperation priming as well as the payment effect and may be interpreted as a counter effect. 
Our findings are, however, in accordance with research results in behavioral economics show-
ing that the main effect of images of eyes is to reduce the size of the group of people who act 
solely in their own self-interest. Images of eyes have no effect on the group of people who are 
already acting in a prosocial way (Haley and Fessler 2005; Rigdon et al. 2009).  
 
 
16 
6 Discussion 
As large-scale population surveys are predominantly based on interviewer-assisted data col-
lection and while incentivizing is becoming a more and more common practice in survey re-
search, this paper investigates whether these structural conditions of interview situations in-
fluence individual preferences on income inequality. Following goal-framing theory (GFT) 
and empirical justice research, the main argument was that in both structural conditions, dif-
ferent types of social relationships are established and either a normative or a gain frame is 
activated on the respondent’s side. The consequence of the different framing is that respond-
ents apply different distributive principles when they evaluate income inequalities. In the case 
of a normative framing, the equality principle is dominant and in the case of a gain frame, the 
equity principle. Therefore, it was expected that the presence of another person in the room 
along with the establishment of a collaborative relationship would influence respondents’ 
preferences in favor of a more equal distribution of incomes. When they are paid for partici-
pating and a competitive relationship is established, they prefer more unequal distributions. 
The results from two experiments conducted with undergraduate students at a German univer-
sity show that establishing a competitive relationship and incentivizing respondents results in 
a response bias towards inequality. The results on the interviewer presence are not as straight-
forward. The combination of interviewer presence and an induced collaborative relationship 
results in an equality bias. Hence, the mere presence of an interviewer is not sufficient for 
triggering a normative framing of the interview situation. Using eye cues as a substitute for 
interviewer presence does not activate equality orientations. In contrast, the results suggest 
that respondents feel watched or controlled by the stylized eyes on the computer screen, 
which undermines the perception as a collaborative relationship and the activation of a norma-
tive goal frame. The effects of eye cues under the condition of an experimentally induced 
competitive relationship are in line with our theoretical argument. Here, respondents seem to 
align their evaluation to what is expected to be the social norm, meaning they prefer a more 
equal distribution.  
Generally, our results show that measures of justice attitudes are affected by situational condi-
tions and cues. Certainly, since we used student samples and the interviewer settings in both 
experiments were not exactly in line with those used in large population surveys, the results 
cannot be generalized and simply transferred to the “survey reality.” Our assumptions must be 
tested under conditions which are closer to survey reality. Nevertheless, we can show that 
there are design effects which have to be controlled for as they affect the substantive findings 
of surveys on justice attitudes.  
Overall, our results show that population surveys on attitudes towards social inequality or 
social justice should not rely on one mode of data collection. Each mode is characterized by 
different structural conditions and produces certain situational cues that affect respondents’ 
behavior systematically. If our experimental data reflect a general phenomenon of framing 
and adopting of justice preferences to situational cues, the existing survey data using inter-
viewer-assisted modes may overestimate the equality orientation within a population.  
Our results may also be important for the ongoing discussion whether large-scale population 
surveys should use incentives to increase willingness to participate. Apart from the question 
of whether payment really contributes to a better quality of data by increasing the response 
rates in population surveys, we can show that paying for participation is not only relevant for 
methodological but also substantive issues. If other respondents behave the same way as our 
student sample when they are paid for stating their justice preferences, we may end up with a 
very different picture of the justice preferences within a society. The question for future re-
search is then what attitudes – those resulting from a normative or from a gain framing – are 
relevant for political or other types of behavior.  
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8 Appendix 
Figure A1: Screenshot of eye condition in Study 2 
 
Table A1: Vignette dimensions and their levels used in both experiments 
# Dimensions Levels 
1 Age 30/40/50/60 years 
2 Sex Male/female 
3 Vocational degree Without degree/vocational degree/university degree 
4 Occupation Unskilled worker/door(wo)man/engine driv-
er/clerk/hairdresser/social worker/software engineer/electrical 
engineer/manager/medical doctor  
5 Gross earnings/month Ten values ranging from EUR 500 to 15,000 
6 Children No child/1 child/2 children/3 children/4 children 
7 Performance Below/above average 
8 Economic situation of the firm High profits/threatened by bankruptcy/stable 
 
  
A 55-year-old women with a university degree has three children and works as a clerk. 
She works in a company with a stable economic situation. Her performance is over average. 
Her monthly gross earnings total 1,500 EUR (before tax and other deductions). 
What is the just earning for this person? 
(If you consider the income above as just, so please repeat it here.) 
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Table A2: Inequality aversion with and without priming by interviewer presence (Study 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 with  
interviewer 
with  
interviewer 
without  
interviewer 
without  
interviewer 
Priming -0.031* -0.035** 0.008 0.011 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
Social desirability  -0.020*  0.006 
  (0.011)  (0.012) 
N 63 63 78 78 
 * p<.05 ** p<.01 (one-tailed t-tests), Multi-level regression models (based on a maximum likelihood estimator). 
Models 1 and 2: random intercepts of lab & interviewer; Models 3 and 4: random intercept lab. Controlled for 
sex and age. 
Source: “Experiment on the influence of cooperative relationships on justice evaluations.” Own calculations. 
DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/SFB882.2012.1 
 
 
Table A3: OLS regression of the Gini on competition, control (eyes) and payment (Study 2) 
 (1)  (2)  
 Gini  Gini  
Competition*no eyes ref.  ref.  
Competition*eyes -.0297* (.0172) -.0300* (.0171) 
Cooperation*no eyes -.0458** (.0174) -.0478** (.0172) 
Cooperation*eyes -.0153 (.0175) -.0162 (.0173) 
Soc. des. -.0074 (.0076) -.0080 (.0076) 
Payment [1 = yes]   .0281** (.0126) 
N 198  198  
* p<.05 ** p<.01 (one-tailed t-tests); Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression models. Controlled for sex 
and age. 
Source: “Experiment on the influence of interviewer presence and incentivizing on justice evaluations.” Own 
calculations. DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/SFB882.2012.2  
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